Abstract: ASEAN member states (AMSs) intend to establish the ASEAN Community by 2015. A key component of this goal is the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The AEC Blueprint was initiated to facilitate and monitor the implementation of the AEC during the period 2008-2015. Competition policy will play an important role in the achievement of the AEC. There has been significant progress in regional cooperation to achieve the competition policy targets listed in the AEC Blueprint. Even though only half of AMSs have implemented competition laws, regional cooperation in this area has been fairly strong. The main emphasis has been on publishing regional guidelines and a handbook on competition policy in ASEAN as well as capacity building activities. There needs to be a renewed impetus to implement national competition laws in AMSs that have not done so. There also remain significant opportunities for enforcement cooperation and pooling of resources for capacity building in competition policy in the region.
Introduction
Regional cooperation amongst the ASEAN member states (AMSs) in recent years has been driven by their intention to establish the ASEAN Community by the year 2015. First announced in 2003, the ASEAN Community is to be underpinned by three main pillars, namely the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
1 The achievement of the AEC entails regional integration of the economies of the AMSs.
A key initiative to advance the implementation of the AEC has been the AEC Blueprint which was first announced in 2006 and adopted in 2007. In the AEC Blueprint, the AEC will be advanced by:
"identifying the characteristics and elements of the AEC by 2015 consistent with the Bali Concord II with clear targets and timelines for implementation of various measures as well as pre-agreed flexibilities to accommodate the interests of all ASEAN Member Countries" (ASEAN, 2008, p.5) .
The list of key characteristics and elements of the AEC includes: (i) a single market and production base, (ii) a highly competitive economic region, (iii) a region of equitable economic development, and (iv) a region fully integrated into the global economy. In the Blueprint, competition policy has been identified as a key area of emphasis to achieve "a highly competitive economic region". 2 In this regard, a number of "priority actions" were identified and scheduled to be implemented during the period 2008-2015.
The main purpose of this study is to provide a review of ASEAN regional cooperation on competition policy in terms of the implementation of the priority actions identified in the AEC Blueprint. Aside from assessing the degree, efficacy and impact of implementation of the priority actions, this study will provide an analysis of the remaining gaps in implementation as well as policy recommendations to address these gaps in the future.
3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the role of competition policy in the AEC. Section 3 focuses on the implementation and enforcement of competition law in ASEAN countries. Section 4 provides an assessment of competition policy and regional cooperation in the AEC Blueprint.
Section 5 concludes the report by summarizing the key findings and by providing some policy recommendations.
Competition Policy in the ASEAN Economic Community
Competition is clearly an important aspect of ASEAN's vision of regional economic integration. It is integral to all four characteristics of the AEC. The formation of a single market and production base is premised upon the notion of competition across markets in the ASEAN countries. The economic competitiveness of the ASEAN region and its integration into the global economy requires that its member countries are able to compete globally. 4 Competition also ensures that the benefits from regional integration are equitably distributed between and amongst consumers and producers in the region as well as amongst ASEAN-member countries. In this regard, competition policy, defined as any governmental policy that promotes competition in markets, is an important policy in the realization of the AEC.  a single market and production base  a highly competitive economic region  a region of equitable economic development, and  a region fully integrated into the global economy.
In the above characterization of the AEC, both internal and external aspects of regional integration are important. The creation of a single market and production base is to be achieved via the "four freedoms" in the cross-border movement of goods, services, capital and labour (internally) within the ASEAN region (Lloyd, 2005 and Wattanapruttipaisan, 2006) . 6 In addition, this is augmented by the presence of institutions and policies relating to competition, consumer protection, intellectual property rights and infrastructure development that would further reduce internal within-border (or beyond the border) frictions.
The economies of AMSs are generally open to trade and investment. The development strategies of many AMSs have entailed export-oriented industrialization driven by foreign direct investment (FDI). Thus, the external dimensions of the AEC are important. They are aimed at enhancing the attractiveness of the region as a whole to FDI as well as ensuring that the region remains embedded within the global production network.
The AEC also recognizes that the level of development amongst ASEAN countries is currently uneven. It includes some emphasis on the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as well as capacity-building activities that are needed to address this problem.
(b) Competition Policy and the Achievement of the AEC
Even though competition policy is placed as a priority area under the objective of achieving a competitive economic region, its role and importance clearly goes beyond this. This is implied in the definition of competition policy in the ASEAN
Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy:
7 "Competition policy can be broadly defined as a governmental policy that promotes or maintains the level of competition in markets, and includes governmental measures that directly affect the behaviour of enterprises and the structure of industry and markets."
The above broad definition of competition policy suggests that some of the policies that enhance the "four freedoms" such as trade (goods and services) and market liberalization can be considered to be competition policies in so far as they enhance the degree of competition in markets. If one adopts this view, competition policies have been implemented in many ASEAN countries long before national competition laws were enacted in many of these countries. Such policies have sometimes been also construed as part of a country's industrial policy.
Industrial policy has been defined as government policy aimed at supporting specific firms or/and sectors in such a way as to bring about structural changes in the economy. 8 When such policies involve the reduction of import tariffs and non-tariff barriers, they clearly have pro-competition effects. Thus, such policy initiatives undertaken to achieve the AEC can be considered to be competition policies. In general, the achievement of the AEC is likely to also require the reduction or scaling back of industrial policies that lessen competition such as industrial policies aimed at supporting infant industry or national champions via import restrictions and entry barriers (e.g. restrictions via licensing).
(c) Competition Policy, Competition Law and the AEC
Competition policy includes but is not restricted to competition law.
Competition law is one component (albeit a very important one) of competition policy. National competition laws are legislations that "support competition by prohibiting anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, anti competitive mergers and other restrictive trade practices" (ASEAN, 2010a, p.6) . The efficacy of competition laws also depend on ancillary legislations that establish the relevant enforcement agencies (hereafter, "competition agency").
In addition, most AMSs have sectoral laws containing provisions that deal with competition-related matters. This is important when such sectors are excluded from a country's national competition law. These include Brunei (telecommunications), 
Competition Law Implementation and Enforcement
National competition law is a relatively new phenomenon in ASEAN. The first wave of implementation occurred in the aftermath of the 1997/1998 Asian Financial
Crisis. Two AMSs that were severely affected by the crisis, Indonesia and Thailand, enacted their national competition laws in 1999. Since then, three more AMSs have joined the ranks of countries with national competition laws. The AEC has provided further impetus for the implementation of competition law in the region.
Status of Implementation
Amongst the ten AMSs, five have implemented comprehensive national (general) competition laws ( Table 1) . They are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Competition laws in these countries were implemented in three distinct waves. The decision to implement competition policy varied from one country to another.
The first wave occurred immediately after the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis.
Indonesia and Thailand implemented their national competition laws in 1999.
Indonesia's decision to implement competition law was influenced by IMF assistance program (Pangestu, et al., 2002 ). Thailand's decision was purely internally driven and was facilitated by the passage of the country's new constitution in 1997 (Nikomborirak, 2006 (Ong, 2006) . The WTO Accession was the main driver to Viet Nam's implementation of its competition law. The
Malaysian government started drafting competition law as early as 1991 (Lee, 2005) .
Prior to the present law, two entirely different set of draft competition laws were completed (and subsequently abandoned). Malaysia finally implemented its competition law in 2010. The Malaysian government's decision to implement competition law was not influenced by the AEC Blueprint. 
Comparative Analysis of Competition Laws
There are significant differences in competition laws of the five AMSs which have such laws. A number of factors may have contributed to this such as negotiations/discussions between stakeholders during the drafting stages, prevailing best-practices, and influences from different existing competition laws (transplant or model laws).
Competition laws in AMSs differ in terms of a number of dimensions. These include the objectives of the law, content/provisions, legal standard (per se vs. ruleof-reason) and the form as well as quantum of sanctions. This is an important topic in the context of the AEC. The implications of these differences such as their impacts on transactions costs and cross-border investments are explored in greater detail in the next section. In the rest of this section, we examine some of these key differences.
(a) Objectives
The objectives of competition laws are important for they provide the reasons for having such laws in the first place and also because they influence the manner in which such laws are drafted, implemented and enforced. Even though the objectives of competition law are important, they are often not explicitly stated in the law in itself. In such cases, they can be inferred from statements and speeches from enforcement agencies or ministries. It is perhaps important to state such objectives if a particular competition law is expected to achieve goals (e.g. development) other than those which are normally associated with competition laws (e.g. efficiency and consumer welfare). Despite recent arguments that competition law can serve both competition and regional integration, there can be a conflict between the two objectives (Jones & Suffrin, 2011, p.43) . For example, the inter-penetration of new markets may require marketing expenses that can only be recovered via retail price maintenance or territorial restrictions which are considered anti-competitive practices (ibid, pp.695-696). In the cases of AMSs, national development and competitiveness objectives may also conflict with a regional integration objective. For example, a country's intent on making its industry "competitive" internationally via ensuring larger domestic production (e.g. to achieve scale economies) may restrict imports -a move that is against regional integration. Sectoral interdependence may also result in a reduction in the overall national competitiveness due to protection of selected industries which raises input costs of other industries. 
(b) Contents / Provisions
The competition laws in AMSs may have similar objectives but there remain significant differences especially in terms of threshold levels and sanctions. 10 This is evident from a comparison of the competition laws of the five AMSs.
In the area of horizontal anti-competitive agreements, these competition laws differ in terms of the presence and size of market threshold levels ( Table 3) . No threshold levels are specified for the assessment of horizontal anti-competitive agreements in the competition laws of Thailand and Malaysia. For countries with threshold specification(s), it differs from one country to another. The legal standards applied may also differ across AMSs. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam consider horizontal anti-competitive agreements to be per se illegal while Singapore regards certain types of such agreements to be per se illegal.
The applicable sanctions for such agreements also vary significantly across ASEAN countries in terms of various dimensions such as criminal vs. civil (financial) penalty, basis (% of turnover or lumpsum) and quantum (fine amount or length of prison sentence).
Similar types of variations can be found in the case of provisions related to abuse of dominance (Table 4 ) and merger controls ( Table 5 ). In the case of merger controls, Malaysia stands out as not having any provisions on merger controls.
Merger controls in Thailand is currently non-operational due to the absence of any threshold specifications.
The above differences are worth emphasizing given the goal of single market and production base in the AEC. Within the EU, for example, mergers involving concentrations with community dimension requires are view by the European Commission. 11 In so far as mergers do not have such dimensions, they are evaluated on the basis of national merger controls. Such mergers controls can be harmonized without the creation of a single enforcement body at the regional level. 
Enforcement Performance
The earliest AMSs to implement competition law such as Indonesia and
Thailand have had at least ten years of enforcement experience. An assessment of the performance of competition law regimes in these countries as well as newer ones is an important exercise. Many factors may impinge on the performance of a given competition regime -some exogenous while others were determined by the ways in which the law itself was drafted as well as the manner in which the enforcement agency was set up. An assessment of enforcement performance of existing competition law regimes provides an opportunity for newer competition regimes (as well as countries intending to establish one) to learn valuable lessons. This subsection provides a brief assessment of the performance of competition law regimes in AMSs with such laws. There is currently no comprehensive and consistent database on competition law enforcement in AMSs. What follows is based on data collected from the websites of the enforcement agencies and other secondary sources. The review is confined to only five countries that have implemented comprehensive national competition laws, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
(a) Indonesia
Amongst AMSs with competition law, Indonesia can claim to have the most mature competition regime in terms of enforcement experience. KPPU, the enforcement agency, has handled a total of 249 cases during the period 2000-2010.
Despite some fluctuations in the number of cases handled in recent years, there is an overall upward trend in the cases handled since KPPU's establishment (Table 6 ).
This has been made possible by the cumulative knowledge and growth in manpower. An area in competition law enforcement which has lagged in recent years is merger controls. Even though the law mandates merger notification, guidelines and regulations pertaining to merger notification were only announced in 2010. In that year, seven cases were handled. 
(b) Malaysia
Malaysia has also adopted a gradual approach to the enforcement of competition law. Table 7) . This is not surprising given Singapore's role as a major international commercial and financial hub in the region. CCS is currently in the process of reviewing its procedural guidelines for 
(d) Thailand
Thailand (together with Indonesia in 1999) was one of the first ASEAN countries to implement competition law. However, unlike Indonesia, much of the momentum in enforcement was lost in the early years of the law due to a number of factors. Between 1999 and 2011, some 79 complaints were lodged ( Table 8) budget of the OCC is estimated to be around 30 employees and USD100,000. This is small compared to the size of KPPU's resources of around 300+ staff and USD10 million+ budget. Overall, the performance in both the implementation and enforcement of competition law amongst AMSs is clearly a mixed one. This is evident from a review of the implementation status as well as the enforcement performance in AMSs. The key challenges in the introduction of competition law are: (i) the government's understanding of the benefits of competition law, and (ii) the lack of public awareness. In this regard, the careful selection of competition cases with high public interest and reasonable chance of success can be a crucial strategy for both capacity building as well as to convince the government and the public of the importance of competition law. The experiences of Indonesia, Singapore and Viet Nam support this view. For countries about to embark on implementing competition law, these insights ought to be combined with the importance of getting the institutional procedures right (as the Thai case illustrates).
Competition Policy and Regional Cooperation in the AEC

Blueprint
Competition plays an important role in the realization of the AEC. This recognition has led to the incorporation of competition policy as a key element in the AEC Blueprint. Specific targets and milestones for the implementation of competition policy have been incorporated in the AEC Blueprint. ASEAN regional cooperation on competition policy in recent years has been driven by these targets and milestones.
"Competition policy" is one of the six items under the goal of "competitive economic region" in the AEC Blueprint. The other five items are consumer protection, intellectual property rights, infrastructure development, taxation and ecommerce. This placement within the section on "competitive economic region" implies that the effective implementation of competition policy can enhance the competitiveness of ASEAN as an economic community or region. This is appropriate given the importance of competition in ensuring the efficient allocation of resources.
In the AEC Blueprint, five actions or targets for competition policy were listed.
Each of these is reviewed below. In assessing the degree of achievement or implementation, we assign three labels, namely, "high" (action fully implemented by all AMSs or designated body), "moderate" (action not fully implemented but by more than half of AMSs), and "low" (implementation by less than half of AMSs).
(a) Implementation of Competition Law
The first action on competition policy relates to the implementation of competition law in AMSs. In addition, the implementation of competition law in some of these countries needs to take into account their small size. The achievement of scale economies is difficult in small market economies and such markets tend to be dominated by a few large firms. As such, these countries may consider merger controls that are more accommodating of efficiency defenses and less emphasis on per se rule prohibitions on cooperative agreements involving SMEs (Gal, 2001 & Gal, 2003 . This also implies that the cost-benefit analysis of implementing competition law in such countries is likely to depend on how competition law is implemented and when they are implemented.
The experiences from AMSs that have implemented competition law may imply that the moderate achievements in countries that have not enacted competition law may not necessarily be a bad thing. Successful enforcement of competition law requires both strong domestic public as well as political support and adequate manpower and financial resources. Without these pre-conditions, the drafting process and enactment of competition law may result in a dysfunctional competition regime.
(b) Establishment of Competition Policy Network
The second action on competition policy relates to the establishment of a competition policy network involving AMSs. The action is stated in the Blueprint as: "Establish a network of authorities or agencies responsible for competition policy to serve as a forum for discussing and coordinating competition policies."
The level of implementation for the above action can be considered to be high The activities of the working group on capacity building continue to be very important for AMSs ( Table 9) . Between 2008 and 2011, it has organized 14 capacity building activities involving 700 government officials from AMSs. Source: AEGC As the AEGC matures and as more AMSs implement competition law, more attention is being paid on the issue of regional core competencies. This is reflected in the three workshops on developing regional core competencies held in the past two years in Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand. The working group on regional core competencies is currently developing a manual of regional core competencies in three major focus areas, namely: (i) institutional building, (ii) enforcement and (iii) advocacy. The final draft of manual is expected to be completed by the end of 2012.
Finally, the working group on advocacy will begin developing tools for customized advocacy strategies in 2012. In addition, efforts are also under way to collect and compile case studies from the AMSs. This activity will be useful in documenting and assessing the benefits from implementing competition policy in the region.
Overall, the high frequency and range of activities organized by AEGC and involving officials from AMSs suggest that the competition policy network anchored around the AEGC is fairly strong ( Table 9 ). In addition, AEGC has recently embarked on initiatives aimed establishing higher-levels of cooperation involving competition agencies and competition-related agencies from AMSs.
(c) Capacity Building Programs and Activities
The third action listed in the AEC Blueprint focuses on capacity building activities aimed at developing national competition policy in AMSs. The action was formally stated in the Blueprint in the following manner: "Encourage capacity building programmes/activities for ASEAN Member Countries in developing national competition policy."
The level of implementation for the third action is fairly high based on the number of capacity building-related activities that have been carried out since 2008.
In this regard, the AEGC has played an instrumental role in organizing capacity building activities such as workshops and conferences in the region. It has organized 19 capacity workshops between 2008 and 2012. Given that competition policy and law is a relatively new phenomenon in the ASEAN region, the capacity building activities have focused on a number of key areas, namely (Table 10) :
 Objectives and benefits of competition policy,  Scope of competition policy, and
As more AMSs implement competition law, the focus of such activities is likely to shift more towards international-cooperation and enforcement-related activities in the future. In addition, as AMSs gain further experiences in enforcement, intra-ASEAN sharing of experiences is likely to become more frequent.
The host countries for these capacity-building activities can benefit significantly via its ability to send more country participants. In this respect, the sequencing of capacity building activities across AMSs suggests that there has been more emphasis on countries that have either recently implemented comprehensive competition law (such as Viet Nam and Malaysia) or have not done so (Brunei, Cambodia and Lao PDR) ( Table 11) . In this regard, a potentially important issue is the resources available at small AMSs with low per capita income that have yet to implement competition law. Whilst financial resources can be obtained via funding from external agencies, the lack of human resources may be a more difficult problem to tackle. Thus, whilst capacity building activities are more urgent in such countries, resource constraints in these countries are more severe. Finally, plans are already afoot to develop such a pool of experts under the ASEAN-GIZ Project on
Competition Policy and Law (CPL). When implemented, this initiative is likely to enhance the capacity building process in the area of competition law in AMSs. The Guideline can potentially lead to convergence of competition laws in ASEAN if its member states refer to it in their draft and revision processes.
However, there has been no competition law which was adopted after the Guideline came in. Therefore, convergence is a future task.
Another issue that is indirectly raised by the Guideline is the need to carefully consider issues related to competition law at the community-level (ASEAN). This is particularly important in the context of AEC, as expressed in the Guideline: In this regard, the direction taken by AMSs is likely to be influenced by the future direction of ASEAN and the AEC. The supra-national approach may not materialize given AMSs' past preference for avoiding the creation of supranational regional institution (Hill & Menon, 2010) . This implies that the cost-benefit calculus of alternative institutional arrangements is likely to go beyond economic considerations.
(e) Additional Priority Actions
Aside from the four actions on competition policy, the AEC Blueprint also -Discussions on best practices in competition law which can be considered to be a precursor to the ASEAN Regional Guideline on Competition Policy.
-Recommendations on cooperative arrangement and activities by AMSs in the area of competition policy and law.
-List of activities that can be carried out by AEGC for the next five years.
-Recommendations on best practices in the design and delivery of technical assistance and capacity building programs.
For the period covering 2010 and beyond, the additional actions included in the Blueprint included the following:
-"Drawing up a regional work plan on Competition Policy and Law with special focus: capacity building and the introduction of best practices for introducing competition policy."
-"Exploring funding opportunities for the implementation of selected elements of the work plan in line with the strategic schedules of AEC building."
The priority action on the regional work plan was completed in 2010 in the form of a capacity building road map. As discussed earlier, the AEGC has actively organized capacity building activities since 2008. There is clearly an urgent need to undertake a work plan for capacity building. The emerging expertise within the ASEAN grouping as well as the dearth of expertise especially in countries at the initial stage of implementation suggests that there is a dire need for such a work plan.
In this regard, the AEGC has tabled a capacity building roadmap (at the regional level) at the sixth AEGC Meeting on 8-9 July 2010 in Brunei.
The priority action on the exploration of funding opportunities for the work plan has been completed partly via commitments from a number of donor agencies. To date, the funding of capacity building activities by various enforcement agencies and AEGC has been carried out on a fairly ad-hoc basis. During the period under review, the AEGC has received funding for capacity building from: 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The AEC Blueprint, with its list of priority actions and schedules, provides an opportunity for AMSs to focus on operational aspects of achieving regional economic integration in the form of the AEC. Many of the key areas that ASEAN has focused on to achieve this objective involves the promotion of the competition process. In fact, competition is a key aspect of regional integration and competition policy is an essential instrument.
In The reviews and assessments presented in this study point to a few broad policy recommendations. The recommendations are organized into two categories, namely those implementable before 2015 and after 2015.
In the case of policy emphasis for the period up to 2015, priority should be given to addressing the problem of the implementation of competition laws in the remaining countries which have not done so. As a response to the current state of implementation, a renewal of commitment at the SEOM-level is required to ensure compliance to the 2015 deadline. For countries that do not have the requisite resources and institutions, future capacity-building activities should be specifically targeted towards meeting the needs of these countries.
With trade and services liberalization, cross-border intra-ASEAN competition cases are expected to become more important. Under the aegis of regional cooperation, AEGC should begin explorations of the possible arrangements for enforcement cooperation, including general information exchange, case-handling guidelines, etc. These may range from informal approaches to more formal arrangements. Past experience suggests that informal approaches involving sharing of enforcement experiences and non-confidential documents especially in mergerrelated cases can be fairly effective (Jenny, 2002) . In contrast, more formal arrangements tend to be more time-consuming and often require formal treaties (bilateral, or plurilateral). In the past, formal avenues of cooperation have been incorporated in trade agreements. A road map (similar to that for capacity building) needs to be put in place to begin this process.
Due to the scarce expertise and talents, there is a need to consider pooling resources for capacity building at the ASEAN-level. Donors are increasingly interested to fund capacity-building at the regional rather than national level. New institutions and delivery mechanisms should be considered, e.g. pool of experts, and competition law and economics training programs in the region. At present, plans are already afoot to develop such a pool of experts under the ASEAN-GIZ Project on
Competition Policy and Law (CPL). Training programs may be self-funded in collaboration with institutions of higher learning operating in the ASEAN region. A first step should be taken by identifying and negotiating with one or two reputable universities located in the countries with established track record in competition law enforcement (such as Indonesia and Singapore).
In the longer term (beyond 2015), there is a need to broaden the policy discussions and formulations to more explicitly include competition, competition policy and industrial policy as a key aspect of regional integration. The role and impact of competition policy, broadly defined, is certainly pervasive within the vision of AEC. This aspect is already recognized in some AMSs such as Indonesia where competition authorities have legal mandate to provide policy advice on competition-related matters.
In addition there is a need to consider how competition policy and law should be embedded and co-evolve with regional integration. Is there a need, for example, for greater harmonization and convergence amongst competition law regimes within ASEAN? How might EU's experience differ from ASEAN's given their different approaches to regional integration. The sequencing of the regional integration process in ASEAN will impact how competition policy at the regional level should be addressed.
A key debate in regional integration is the geographical agglomeration effects that emerge in terms of competition and location. The perception of unequal benefits from the implementation of competition policy and law needs to be examined and considered further. This is particularly important given the uneven state of development across the AMSs.
There is a need to re-evaluate the role and modus-operandi of AEGC as the key drive for competition policy/law in the AMSs. This includes a consideration of whether there is a need to go beyond the focus on "competition law as competition policy". Given the current state of competition policy implementation, this is likely to be a post-2015 issue. Central to this issue is the question of how much regional centralization and coordination is needed or desirable. Related to this is the question of evolution towards a higher level of intra agency-level cooperation. This is a question pertaining to the evolution of AEC in the long-term.
Finally, the present priority action relates primarily to the introduction of competition laws. As some of the existing competition law regimes are not functioning optimally, AMSs should consider how to assist in reforming such
regimes. This will definitely go beyond capacity-building exercises that are mainly of interest to newer competition regimes. 3 This study is developed from the authors' unpublished paper, namely Lee and Fukunaga (2012) . 4 Note that firms in a country are unlikely to be competitive internationally without being competitive in the domestic market due to lack of incentives to be efficient and innovative. Such firms can still compete internationally if it enjoys protection or/and subsidies in their home markets but at significant costs to consumers and tax payers in the home country. 5 ASEAN (2008), p.6. 6 The emphasis on such freedoms may be a question of degree compared to the theoretical ideal.
For example, in the case of capital movement, the emphasis in the AEC Blueprint is on "freer flow" of capital rather than "free" movement of capital. 7 ASEAN (2010a), p.3.
8 See Lee (2010) for a more detailed discussion. 9 For more details see ASEAN (2012) . 10 For an early discussion of differences in the competition laws of Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam see Pupphavesa, et al. (2009). 11 Community dimensions refer to cases involving large firms with significant presence across a number of EU countries. 12 The following discussions rely on Nikomborirak (2006) and Kohpaiboon & Tanasritunyakul (2010 
